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who responded to the questionnaire, making this study possible.The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data for 1990, which were
released in October 1991, showed substantially higher denial rates for black
and Hispanic applicants than for white applicants. These minorities were two
to three times as likely to be denied mortgage loans as whites. In fact,
high-income minorities in Boston were more likely to be turned down than low-
income whites. The 1991HMDA data, which are being released currently, show a
similar pattern.
This pattern has triggered a resurgence of the debate on whether
discrimination exists in home mortgage lending. Some people believe that the
disparities in denial rates are evidence of discrimination on the part of
banks and other lending institutions. Others, including lenders, argue that
such conclusions are unwarranted, because the HMDA data do not include
information on credit histories, loan-to-value ratios, and other factors
considered in making mortgage decisions. These missing pieces of information,
they argue, explain the high denial rates for minorities.
Because the applicant and loan characteristics collected under HMDA are
indeed limited, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, with the support of the
other supervisory agencies, asked financial institutions operating in the
Boston Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) to provide additional information
on the financial and employment variables that lenders have indicated are
relevant to the mortgage lending decision. This information was requested for
all applications for conventional mortgage loans made by blacks and Hispanics
in 1990 and for a random sample of 3300 applications made by whites.
Substantial lender cooperation resulted in a very good response rate and high-
quality data. The additional data, combined with Census information on
neighborhood characteristics, were Used to develop a model of the determinants
of mortgage lending decisions in the Boston area. This model was thenemployed to test whether race was a significant factor in the lending decision
once financial, employment, and neighborhood characteristics were taken into
account.
The results of this study indicate that minority applicants, on average,
do have greater debt burdens, higher loan-to-value ratios, and weaker credit
histories and they are less likely to buy single-family homes than white
applicants, and that these disadvantages do account for a large portion of the
difference in denial rates. Including the additional information on applicant
and property characteristics reduces the disparity between minority and white
denials from the originally reported ratio of 2.7 to 1 to roughly 1.6 to I.
But these factors do not wholly eliminate the disparity, since the adjusted
ratio implies that even after controlling for financial, employment, and
neighborhood characteristics, black and Hispanic mortgage applicants in the
Boston metropolitan area are roughly 60 percent more likely to be turned down
than whites. This discrepancy means that minority applicants with the same
economic and property characteristics as white applicants would experience a
denial rate of 17 percent rather than the actual white denial rate of 11
percent. Thus, in the end, a statistically significant gap remains, which is
associated with race.
The information gathered in this survey provides some insight into how
this outcome emerges. Many observers believe that no rational lender would
turn down a perfectly good application simply because the applicant is a
member of a minority group. The results of this survey confirm this
perception; minorities with unblemished credentials are almost (97 percent)
certain of being approved. But the majority of borrowers - both white and
minority - are not perfect, and lenders have considerable discretion over theextent to which they consider these imperfections as well as compensating
factors.
To take just one example, two key standards for selling mortgage loans
in the secondary market are the "obligation ratios," which relate the
applicant’s housing expense to total income and total debt burden to total
income. Secondary market guidelines suggest benchmarks of 28 percent and 36
percent, respectively, although they go on to add that "a lender may use a
higher ratio.., when there are fully documented compensating factors ..."
(Fannie Mae 1992, p. 654). More than one-half of the applications in this
sample exceeded one of these benchmarks, and lenders approved and sold into
the secondary market some loans with ratios in excess of 36 percent and 44
percent, respectively.
The secondary market’s flexibility in this area undoubtedly increases
the general availability of mortgage funds for both minorities and whites.
Moreover, this willingness to lend to imperfect borrowers is justified:
historically, residential mortgages have been very safe investments...The
difficulty is that unless primary market lenders apply the flexibility in a
nondiscriminatory manner, minority applicants will not benefit to the same
degree as white applicants. The results of this study suggest that for the
same imperfections whites seem to enjoy a general presumption of
creditworthiness that black and Hispanic applicants do not, and that lenders
seem to be more willing to overlook flaws for white applicants than for
minority applicants.
The preponderance of flawed applicants and the significant discretion
accorded lenders have important implications for the efficacy of bank
examinations for compliance with the fair lending laws. Since the bulk of
applications contain some flaws, most denials will appear legitimate by someobjective standard. Moreover, this study found that denied black/Hispanic
applications on average have poorer objective qualifications than denied white
applications; that is, as measured by the median value, denied minorities had
lower income and wealth, higher obligation and loan-to-value ratios, and worse
credit histories than denied whites. If these patterns hold true elsewhere, a
systematic bias in mortgage lending is very difficult to document at the
institution level, particularly when the number of minority applications is
small, as it is in the vast majority of institutions. It becomes apparent
only when many applications are aggregated. As the supervisory agencies
themselves have already recognized, under existing examination procedures,
examiners can be expected to uncover only the most flagrant abuses.
I. The Boston Area and the Boston Fed’s 1989 Study of Mortgage Lending
Boston is the eighth largest metropolitan statistical area in the
nation, with a population in 1990 of 2.9 m~llion.I The area comprises more
than 100 politically distinct cities and towns. The largest of these
communities is the City of Boston, with a population of 574,000. Boston is an
old city with long-established neighborhoods, many of which are defined along
ethnic and racial lines. The communities surrounding the City of Boston were
also founded many years ago and their development has taken varied paths.
Some are lightly populated, almost exclusively residential communities.
Others function as small cities in their own right, as well as suburbs to the
City of Boston.
i Boston is actually considered a primary metropoTitan statistical area
(PMSA), meaning that it falls within an even larger agglomeration called a
consolidated metropolitan statistical area (CMSA). The Boston CMSA is the
seventh largest in the nation and stretches north into New Hampshire.
4About 15 percent of the Boston area population is minority (Table I).
As can be seen from the map, the minority population, especially the black
population, is concentrated in the City of Boston and surrounding communities.
Seventy percent of blacks live in the City, where they make up 24 percent of
the population. Within the City, blacks also tend to be very concentrated;
many live in neighborhoods where more than 50 percent of the population is
black. The Hispanic population tends ~o live in the area’s smaller cities as
well as in the City of Boston. Both blacks and Hispanics are underrepresented
in the more residential, suburban communities. Many of the more rural
communities are almost entirely white.
A relatively small proportion of the Boston PMSA housing stock is in
single-unit structures and a relatively large fraction is made up of
properties with two to four units. Single-unit properties are especially
scarce, and two- to four-unit properties are most common in the City of Boston
and some of the small cities. This pattern may have some bearing on mortgage
lending decisions, because evaluating an application to purchase a property
with more than one unit requires an assessment of the stream of rental income
that will be generated by the additional units.
In 1989, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston examined the pattern of
mortgage lending in the City of Boston and concluded that housing and mortgage
credit markets were functioning in a way that hurt black neighborhoods
(Bradbury, Case, and Dunham 1989). The number of mortgage originations
relative to the owner-occupied housing stock was 24 percent lower in black
neighborhoods than in white neighborhoods, after taking account of economic
variables such as income, wealth, and other factors.2 The study, however,
2The results were consistent with some earlier studies that have found
evidence of redlining (Avery and Buynak 1981; Dedman and others 1988; Gabriel
and Rosenthal 1991). Three other studies, however, found no conclusiveTabl e I





Percent Distribution b.y Race




Not in Central City
2,870.7 85.0 6.8 4.5 3.7
574.3 59.0 23.8 10.8 6.4
299.9 80..0 7.1 7.5 5.4
1,996.5 93.2 ~1.9 2.2 2.7
aNot of Hispanic origin.
bCambridge, Framingham, Lynn and Waltham. Only Cambridge borders the City of Boston.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of Population and Housinq.Census Tracts in the Boston Metropolitan Area
Percentage Non-White





o 2.5 5 7.5 lOcould not distinguish between discrimination in the housing market and
discrimination in the mortgage market. From the available data, it was not
possible to sort out the precise role played by lenders, as opposed to buyers,
sellers, developers, realtors, appraisers, insurers, and others. Thus, a
possible interpretation of the earlier study was that fewer mortgages were
made in black neighborhoods because people in black neighborhoods did not buy
houses as frequently as residents of white neighborhoods and therefore did not
apply for as many mortgages.
The results of this study do not suffer from this ambiguity. Instead of
analyzing the location of mortgage loans, this study explores the factors
affecting the decision to approve or deny mortgage applications. In other
words, it bypasses the contention that blacks and Hispanics never enter the
doors of financial institutions and look.s at what happens to individuals after
they are inside the institution and actually apply for a mortgage loan. Such
a study is possible because amendments to HMDA in 1989 required that lenders
report not only the location of loans actually made but also the sex, race,
and income of individual applicants and whether the application was approved
or denied.3 Thus, 1990 was the first year for which information was
evidence that redlining had been practiced by lenders (Benston, Horsky, and
Weingartner 1978; Canner, Gabriel, and Woolley 1991; Schafer and Ladd 1981).
The different results from these studies appear to depend on the definition of
redlining used by the researcher. Studies that characterized redlining in
terms of the amount of lending in a particular area were more likely to find
evidence of redlining. Others that looked at differences in the terms of
mortgage loans across neighborhoods found no conclusive evidence of redlining.
3The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act was enacted in 1975 in response to
concerns voiced by community activists that banks had demarcated areas in
cities where they were unwilling to make mortgage loans. The legislation
required that banks report the number of mortgage loans made by location of
property. These data, however, were never particularly useful in evaluating
banks’ performance, since standards were not available against which to
evaluate bank lending patterns nor was information available on individual
applicants.available about the applicant as well as the property and about applications
that were denied as well as approved. The new data changed the focus of
concern from "redlining," that is, differential treatment by lenders based on
location of a property, to discrimination~ that is, differential treatment of
applicants based on race or other personal, rather than economic,
characteri sti cs.4
II. The Mortgage Lending Decision
In order to determine whether race plays a role in the lending decision,
it is necessary first to account for all the economic factors that might bear
on the financial institution’s decision. If relevant economic variables are
not considered and they vary across racial groups, then a rational and
legitimate decision to deny a mortgage may appear to be based on race. For
4Although HMDA did not provide information on mortgage applications until
1990, three major studies of applications data were conducted in the late
1970s. In 1977, the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation sponsored a nationwide survey to determine what economic
characteristics were important in bank lending decisions and whether race or
sex entered into the determination (Black, Schweitzer, and Mandell 1978).
Based on an analysis of roughly 5,000 completed returns, the researchers found
that race played a statistically significant, although not particularly large,
role in the lending decision.
In 1981, the MIT-Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies published an
extensive study of mortgage lending decisions in New York and California; one
portion of this study focused on individual applications (Schafer and Ladd
1981). Mortgage application data were provided by state-regulated savings and
loans in California and all state-regulated commercial banks, mutual savings
banks, and savings and loans in New York. Based on the information included
in a very large sample of loans, the authors determined that blacks had a much
greater chance of denial than white applicants with equivalent socioeconomic,
property, and neighborhood characteristics.
The third study was conducted in 1978 by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(King 1980). Examiners collected data for 4,776 mortgage applications in a
special examination of federally insured savings and loan associations in
Miami, San Antonio, and Toledo. The study found statistically significant
evidence that black and Hispanic applicants were more likely to be denied than
comparable White applicants. The researchers speculated that differences in
credit histories might have contributed to this result, but lacked the data to
test this hypothesis.
9example, if minority applicants have poorer credit records than whites,
minorities will be rejected at a higher rate than whites. If credit
information is not included in the analysis, the higher minority denial rate
would appear to be discrimination even if race were never considered by the
lender. ThE only way to determine whether lenders’ decisions are influenced
by race is to include in a model all the economic variables that are available
to the lender and that might cause a loan to be denied, and then test to see
whether race is still a significant and important factor in the decision.
The Mortqaqe Application Process
The mortgage application and approval procedure is complex and far from
mechanical. It generally consists of three steps - a quick review of the
application for viability, verifiCation of the information and an appraisal of
the property, and an evaluation of the numbers and consideration of any
"compensating factors."
An applicant who has decided to purchase a property selects a lender,
based on proximity, attractiveness of rates and fees, or some other factor,
and fills out a standard loan application form, such as Fannie Mae Form 1003.
This can be done at the lender’s site, by mail or via telephone, or by a
mortgage broker at the applicant’s home. The information contained on the
application is used by the intake person or the loan officer to make an
immediate decision as to the ultimate viability of the loan. If the loan does
not appear viable, the lender may make its credit decision at that time and
deny the application. This initial review process saves some borrowers
application ~ees, but also represents the first level of discretion in the
process.
~This paragraph describes the appropriate form of an initial review,
which involves the comPletion of an application and an explicit denial or
encouragement by the lender. Examiners, however, are very concerned about the
10If the lender believes that the applicant has a reasonable chance of
approval, the process enters a more comprehensive stage. The lender attempts
to verify the information to ensure that the applicant has the financial
ability and inclination to repay the loan, and sufficient liquid funds for a
down payment and closing costs. Verification of employment provides some
assurance about both the adequacy of the income and the likelihood of
continuation of the current employment. A credit history report may provide
some information about the applicant’s commitment to paying debts. A
verification of bank deposits indicates whether liquid assets are sufficient;
this step also provides some information about whether a gift, grant, or loan,
rather than savings, serves as the down payment.
if the information on the application is verified, the lender will take
a hard look at the numbers, such as the ratios of monthly housing expense to
income and total obligations to income. These ratios are important indicators
of the ability to sell the mortgage in the s~condary market. Secondary market
purchasers, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, use 28 percent and 36 percent,
respectively, as maximum guidelines for these ratios, but these are
guidelines, and subject to considerable discretion on the part of the lender.
Assuming the application is still viable, the lender will proceed with an
appraisal and calculate the loan-to-value ratio. The secondary market uses 80
percent as a threshold for loan to value, but with private mortgage insurance
higher ratios are permitted.
At this point, the lender is in a position to approve or deny the loan.
If the credit history is clean, the applicant has a good supply of cash, all
prevalence of informal pre-screening where applicants are discouraged from
even filing a formal application or are not provided with the adverse action
notice, which is required by law when the informal process is pursued to the
point where the lender, in fact, makes a credit decision.
11the debt and loan-to-value ratios are within the guidelines, and the property
is a single-family home in a desirable neighborhood, the decision is
relatively easy and, indeed, the application could probably be analyzed and
approved by a computer. However, few (less than 20 percent) borrowers are
without blemish and, therefore, lenders are left considerable room for
subjectivity and discretion. To offset negatives, lenders can use a host of
"compensating factors." For example, to compensate for high debt-to-income
ratios, lenders might note a large down payment, a good record of carrying
high housing expenses, a strong propensity to save and a high level of liquid
assets, and an excellent potential for future earnings based on education and
training. Similarly, to compensate for credit history problems, lenders might
be. willing to accept favorable letters from creditors, extenuating
circumstances such as an adverse judgment in a civil suit, or simply prior
life-circumstances that have changed for the better. In other words, many
flawed loan applications can be brought to a viable status and even made
eligible for sale in the secondary market.
A Model of Mortqaqe Lendinq
The information gathered and analyzed in the mortgage application
process can be used to model the mortgage lending decision. Because little is
known about the relationship between applicant characteristics and actual loan
performance, any model must by necessity explain what lenders actually
consider when making their decisions rather than what they ought to consider.
Mortgage lenders are assumed to maximize the expected profit of the
institution. This goal requires that financial institutions attempt to
minimize the probability and costs of default associated with each mortgageloan.6 This means that the probability of a lender denying a mortgage
application P(D) is a function of the applicant’s ability to carry the loan
(F), the risks of default (R), the potential loss associated with default and
foreclosure (L), and the terms of the loan (T). Although these factors are
listed separately, they are all interrelated; for example, an applicant’s
ability to carry a loan depends on the terms of the loan. If the lender’s
judgment is influenced by the race or other personal characteristics of the
applicant (C), that will also affect the likelihood of denial. That is,
P(D) = f(F,R,L,T,C).
The original HMDA data include only one piece of economic information
about the applicant - namely, income. Income alone actually has less
explanatory power than one might expect, because lower-income borrowers
usually buy lower-priced homes. Moreover, as the discussion above suggests,
many other variables affect the mortgage lending decision. Thus, the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston attempted to augment the 1990 HMDA report by gathering
information on 38 additional variables. These variables were selected on the
basis of numerous conversations with lenders, underwriters, and others
familiar with the lending process. Most of t~e variables come from standard
loan application forms; several are taken from credit reports and a few from
lenders’ worksheets. The following is a brief summary of the major groupings
of variableS.
6Maximizing expected profit requires maximizing the difference between
the return on mortgage lending and the cost of funds to the lender. In the
case of home mortgages, however, applications are usually either rejected or
accepted at the market interest rate. Given expectations of inflation, the
market rate should generate a profit on loans that fulfill monthly payment
commitments. Thus, the primary task facing the lender is avoiding default and
any associated losses. Even if the lender sells the loan on the secondary
market, default remains a concern, as the purchaser can return the loan to the
originator. At a minimum, secondary market buyers will not continue to buy
from lenders whose loans frequently default.
13Ability of applicant to support loan. The original HMDA data did not
include information on two financial concepts - obligation ratios and wealth -
that could have considerable bearing on the applicant’s ability to carry and
repay the mortgage loan. "Obligation ratios," which measure proposed housing
expenses relative to income and total debt payment obligations relative to
income, indicate whether the applicant can afford the mortgage more clearly
than income alone. In addition, because the secondary market has established
guidelines for these ratios and because today most mortgages are sold in the
secondary market, lenders must be concerned about how the obligation ratios
affect the loans’ marketability.
Economists contend that wealth may also be important to the lender’s
decision, since substantial wealth can make debt repayment easy even when
income is low and obligation ratios are high. Not only can wealthy
individuals spend down their wealth, but also liquid assets can be a cushion
that prevents a temporary job loss or other income disruption from resulting
in a mortgage default. Bankers and other lenders who were consulted said,
however, that the available wealth information is not very reliable, and, for
this reason, they tend to place little weight on wealth, with the exception of
verifiable liquid assets. Nevertheless, information was collected on total
assets and total liabilities, as well as liquid assets.
Risk of default. Two groups of variables - one relating to applicants’
reliability as borrowers and one pertaining to the stability of the
applicants’ income - were collected in order to capture the possibility that
the applicants’ circumstances might change and their commitment or ability to
repay the loan might decline.
Reliability of Borrower: Lenders state that they place considerable
weight on applicants~ credit histories in judging their commitment to meeting
14mortgage obligations. The contention is that past behavior may signal
creditworthiness in the future; some people may be more responsible about
credit obligations than others and, therefore, less likely to default. Loan
underwriters tend to view certain elements of the credit report as more
important than others. For example, failure to meet previous mortgage
commitments is said.~o be viewed more seriously than a late credit card
payment. Likewise, public record of default, foreclosure, or bankruptcy is
considered especially damaging to the borrower. This study constructed a
concise outline of the prospective borrower’s past creditor relationships that
provides substantial detail about different Credit categories.
Stability of Income: Mortgage application forms devote considerable
space to questions concerning the-labor force status of the applicant. In
addition to earnings, the lender collects information on industry, profession,
seniority, years in this type of employment, age, and education. These
questions are aimed at determining how easily the applicant will be able to
carry the mortgage not only now, but also over an extended period. This
information was used to calculate a rough estimate of the probability that the
applicant will become unemployed.7 If, because of differences in education
and skills or labor market discrimination, minorities are concentrated in jobs
that have a higher risk of unemployment, then unstable incomes could be the
reason for denials that appear to be attributable to differential treatment in
the lending decision. Only by explicitly including a variable representing
7A more sophisticated approach is also being investigated, which builds
on the job clustering work by Gittleman and Howell (1992) and the information
on individual spells of unemployment, given age, seniority, education level,
and experience, from the University of Michigan’s Panel Study of Income
Dynamics. The simpler approach adopted for this study, which uses 1989
unemployment rates in the Boston area for the major industrial groups, does,
however, capture the concept and also has the advantage of incorporating the
local unemployment situation.
15the probability of becoming unemployed is it possible to distinguish
discrimination in the mortgage market from effects related to race in the rest
of the economy.
Similarly, the earnings of the self-employed are thought to be more
variable than the earnings, of those employed by others. Increased variance of
future income increases the riskiness of the loan. Thus, whether or not the
applicant is self-employed may bear on his ability to get a mortgage loan.
Potential default loss. While credit history and employment stability
provide information about the possibility of default, several other variables
collected provide some indication of the magnitude of the loss should default
and foreclosure occur. These variables include the loan-to-value ratio, the
availability of private mortgage insurance, and neighborhood characteristics
that might affect the stability of the value of the mortgaged property.
Loan-to-Value Ratio: The study collected information on the appraised
value of the home; from these appraised values, loan-to-value ratios were
calculated to measure the borrower’s equity in the property. Loan-to-value
ratios are potentially important indicators of both the risk of default and
the magnitude of a potential loss in the event of foreclosure. The more
equity borrowers have in their properties, the less likely that declining
property values will cause them to abandon their homes to the lender. A
larger cushion also protects lenders from loss.
Private Mortgage Insurance: Since some of the loss associated with
default can be absorbed by insurers of mortgage loans, the survey collected
information on whether applicants applied for private mortgage insurance and
whether their application was approved or denied. To the extent that an
applicant applies for and receives private mortgage insurance, the potential
loss to the lending institution is reduced. More important, the secondary
16market will not accept a mortgage loan that has a loan-to-value ratio in
excess of 80 percent without private mortgage insurance protection. Thus, any
applicant with a high loan-to-value ratio who is refused private mortgage
insurance is likely to be denied the loan. As will be discussed later, the
fact that the insurers are basing their decisions on the same factors as the
lenders makes it difficult to determine the appropriate treatment of private
mortgage insurance in a model of mortgage lending.
Stability of Value: Because of a variety of neighborhood features,
inner-city properties are often thought to carry a higher risk of capital loss
tha~ properties in other areas. While the appraised value should reflect
expectations that the property will rise or decline in value, it may not
capture the uncertainties surrounding these expectations. Risk-averse lenders
will avoid loans with the same expected probability and costs of default but
higher variability of potential losses. As a result, lenders could be
economically motivated to avoid investing in areas that are perceived to be
risky.
Some researchers have included a separate variable for each Census tract
in their analysis to standardize for neighborhood characteristics. This
approach has serious drawbacks when minorities are heavily concentrated in a
few Census tracts because the racial composition of the tract as well as the
race of the applicant may be relevant in the lending decision. A better
approach is to estimate directly the risk associated with the value of
property in different tracts. For this study, the measure adopted was the
ratio of rent to the value Of the rental housing stock in the Census tract
where the property is located, which can be calculated from Census data. To
compensate investors for the higher risk, the same amount of capital invested
17in an area with greater potential for loss should generate a higher stream of
earnings.
Loan characteristics. In order to isolate the effect of race on the
lending decision, it is necessary to hol~ constant the characteristics of the
loan. The sample was limited to conventional mortgages because FHA and VA
loans are uncommon in the Boston metropolitan area.8 The follow-up survey
secured additional information on the duration of the loan, for example 15
years or 30 years; whether the interest rate was fixed or adjustable; and
whether the application was made under a program designed for low-income
individuals. The survey also asked whether the property was a single-family
home, a condominium, or a building with two to four units.
Personal characteristics. The original HMDA data included information
on the sex and race of the applicant and co-applicant. The follow-up survey
requested data on age, marital status, and the number of dependents. Age
could be an indicator of future earnings potential, as earnings tend to rise
with age over the average person’s working life. Similarly, lenders could be
interested in the number of dependents, because the more dependents for any
given level of income, the less money the applicant is likely to have
available to carry the loan.
In summary, the questions in the follow-up survey were designed to
secure all the financial, employment, and demographic information that lenders
may include in their determination to approve or deny a loan application.
Bin the Boston metropolitan area in 1990 only 4 percent of all home-
purchase applications (only 4.5 percent of applications by blacks and 3.5
percent of applications by Hispanics) were for government-backed mortgages.
Thus, the conventional mortgage represented the norm in Boston for blacks,
Hispanics, and whites.
18III. Survey Design and Results
It may be helpful to say a few words about how the sample was designed
and how the data were collected before looking at the results. Because the
high denial rates for minorities prompted the survey and because only 1,200
blacks and Hispanics applied for mortgages in Boston in 1990, the goal was to
collect information on every black and Hispanic applicant. A sample of 3,300
whites was chosen to identify those characteristics that result in rejections
when race is not a factor; this information provides a base against which to
assess the extent to which race contributes to the high rejection rate for
minority applicants. To determine the cause of rejections among whites
requires that the sample inclbde a sufficient number of white rejections;
since the white rejection rate is only 11 percent, a large number of white
applicants was required.
Practical considerations required limiting the institutions.surveyed to
those that had received at least 25 mortgage applications from borrowers of
all races. This reduced the pool of applications only slightly, but cut the
number of institutions to be contacted from 352 to 131. The Boston Fed sent
each of the 131 lending institutions a survey document in the form of an
expanded HMDA register. The register contained the identification number and
the HMDA data that the institution had originally submitted for all its black
and Hispanic applicants and for the random sample of white applicants selected
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.9 For each applicant, 38 additional
pieces of information were requested. (The survey questions are presented in
9The sample of applications by whites was selected randomly rather than
matched with black and Hispanic applications by institution or key borrower
characteristics, because matching would have required prejudging the causes of
rejection and precluded an evaluation of the role that the variables used in
the matching process played in determining rejection rates.
19Appendix A.) The completed forms were returned to the ~Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston for analysis.
Final Sample
A high degree of cooperation by lenders and considerable follow-up
resulted in a very high response to the survey, as can be seen in Table 2.I°
The largest part of the divergence between the survey as designed and the
responses submitted by the institutions was caused by the closing of some
banks that had been significant lenders in 1990. A second source of
difference was that lenders, in the process of providing additional data,
checked their earlier entries and made corrections. In one of the more
notable examples, 51 applications that a suburban bank had coded as Hispanic
on its original HMDA submission were found to be white. Some institutions
were simply unable to locate all their loan files.
The survey response was further refined to derive a sample of completed
applications for conventional loans for the acquisition of residential
property. This required eliminating any application that, upon review, was
for refinancing as opposed to home purchase or for the acquisition of
nonresidential as opposed to residential property, and any application with
missing data for one of the key variables. In addition, the decision was made
to exclude applications that were withdrawn.
1°The institutions participating irn the survey were requested to keep
track of the expenses they incurred in supplying the information. Only
sixteen of the 131 institutions responded with estimates of the hours devoted
to the survey or with dollar expenditure figures. According to these
estimates, the time required to supply all the information for a single loan
averaged about an hour and the dollar cost averaged $30 per loan, a figure
generally consistent with the hourly estimate. These costs are probably
indicative of those experienced by the other lenders participating in the
survey. Applying these estimates to the entire sample indicates that
approximately 4,500 hours were expended in complying with this survey request
and that the total dollar cost was $135,000.
2OTable 2
Comparison of Final Sample with Original HMDA 1.990 Reports, Boston MSA
Total White Black/Hispanic.
Number of Percent Percent





18,838a 16,019 11.0 1,210 30.7
4,443 3,300 11.0 1,143 30.4
4,153a 3,123 11.4 1,013 27.6
3,062 2,340 10.3 722 28.1
~Includes applicants of races other than white, black, or HispanicL
Note: The survey response (4,153) falls short of the survey design (4,443) because of the closing of some
banks that had been significant lenders in 1990, the inability of some lenders to find some loan files, and
corrections to earlier submissions. The fi’nal sample (3,062) falls short of the survey response (4,153)
because some loans had missing data (618), some were withdrawals (232), some were refinancings (200) or for
nonresidential property (24) that lenders had originally coded as home purchase mortgages, and some
applicants proved to be neither white, black, or Hispanic (17).Some experts have suggested that withdrawals may be hidden rejections.
That is, in the process of verifying an application, the lender could
encourage the applicant to withdraw rather than be rejected. However,
applicants might withdraw for a host of other reasons. In particular, the
property might fail an inspection report or the buyer might simply get cold
feet. Withdrawals accounted for roughly 8 percent of both black/Hispanic and
white applications. An examination of the pattern of withdrawals in the
sample revealed, at most, a weak link to race or creditworthiness. Since
retaining withdrawals in the study would have complicated the econometric
presentation that follows and produced uninteresting results, they are not
included in the sample. Despite the reduction in the number of applicants in
the final sample, the pattern of denial rates is fairly close to that reported
in the original HMDA data.
The pattern of lending by type of institution is also very similar to
that reported for the original HMDA data. In both cases, applications are
split relatively evenly between depository institutions and mortgage
companies; this is true for blacks/Hispanics as well as for whites (Table 3).
Values of Key Variables
The values of key variables collected in the follow-up survey are
presented in Table 4 for black/Hispanic applicants and white applicants, both
approved and denied. (Appendix Table AI presents values for the complete list
of variables.) These data and all subsequent analyses combine applications by
blacks and Hispanics. Both blacks and Hispanics had substantially higher
denial rates than whites and the number of applications by Hispanics was too
small to analyze separately. Moreover, statistical tests confirmed that the





White Applications B/H Applications
Percent             Percent
Number Denied Number Denied
Banks, Thrifts, and
Credit Unions 1,638 14.0
Mortgage Companies 1,424 15.1
Subsidiaries 1,297 15.3
Independents 127 12.6
1,265 9.6 373 28.6
1,075 11.1 349 27.5
979 11.3 318 27.7
96 8.3 31 25.8
Total 3,062    14.5 2,340    10.3 722 28.1
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Key Characteristics of Mortgage Applicants, by Race and Loan Disposition
White
Vari able Approved    Den i ed
Black/Hispanic
Approved    Denied
Ability to Support Loan
Housing Expense/Income (percent)a










Rent/Value in Tract (percent)
Percent Applied for Private Mortgage
Insurance
Percent Denied Private Mortgage Insurancec
Loan Characteristics




Percent in Special Loan Programs
Personal Characteristics
26.0 26.6 26.0 28.0
33.0 37.0 34.0 38.0
93,000 75,000 39,000 33,000
4,666 4,471 3,333 3,600
38,000 28,000 19,000 15,500
14.6 3,8.9 23.4 51 .,5
3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2
12.0 22.4 7.5 7.4
77.3 83.1 85.0 90.0
4.6 4.9 7.3 8.9
21.6 17.1 42.2 26.6
.7 75.0 1.3 82.5
7.7 18.3 24.8 34.4
68.6 62.8 60.6 69.6
85.9 83.3 91.1 91.3
12.6 16.1 40.6 40.3
Agea 34.0 35.0 36.0 36.0
Percent Married 63.0 53.2 53.7 55.0
Percent with Dependents 37.6 39.9 52.6 52.2
~Median value.
bpoor credit defined as having more than two late mortgage payments or delinquent consumer
credit histories (more than 60 days past due) or bankruptcies or other public record
defaults.
CBase is those applying for private mortgage insurance.
See Appendix Table AI for complete list of variabl~es.independent variables affected the probability of denial for the two groups
similarly.
The data show that black and Hispanic applicants in the Boston area
differ from white applicants in a number of ways. These differences tend to
support arguments that the higher denial rates experienced by minorities are
attributable, at least in part, to financial characteristics, credit
histories, and other economic factors. As reported in other surveys, black
and Hispanic applicants have considerably less net wealth and liquid assets
than whites. Black and Hispanic applicants also tend to have poorer credit
histories than whites.
Blacks and Hispanics in Boston are substantially more likely than whites
to be purchasing a two- to four-family home. The higher proportion of two- to
four-family homes among denied applicants, for whites as well as for blacks
and Hispanics, suggests that lenders perceive more risk associated with
financing the purchase of such properties. Blacks and Hispanics also make
lower down payments and have higher loan-to-value ratios than whites. Since
the secondary market will not accept a mortgage with a loan-to-value ratio in
excess of 80 percent without mortgage insurance, minorities apply more
frequently for private mortgage insurance.
Blacks and Hispanics have lower incomes than white applicants. They
also purchase less costly homes, however, so their obligation ratios are
similar. Supporting the view that obligation ratios rather than incomes are
the critical variable is the fact that the median income of white applicants
whose loans were approved was virtually the same as the median income of
applicants whose loans were denied; in the case of minority applicants, the
median income of denied applicants actually slightly exceeded the median
income of those whose loans were approved.IV. The Role of Race in the Mortgage Lending Decision
While the data in Table 4 suggest that financial and other differences
between black/Hispanic and white applicants account for a large part of the
disparity in mortgage denial rates, determining whether race plays an
independent role, and how great a role, requires statistical techniques that
hold these characteristics constant. This can be done by estimating an
equation which makes the probability of being denied a mortgage loan a
function of obligation ratios, wealth variables, credit histories, and other
factors thought to affect the mortgage decision. Race is then added to the
equation to determine whether it has any independent effects after the other
factors have been taken into account.
Reqression Results
Table 5 presents the results of a logit regression using the equation
that most closely represents the model discussed earlier. Many other
equations were also estimated, in order to test the robustness of these
results and to incorporate variables used in previous studies or thought to be
important to the mortgage lending decision. A sample of these additional
equations is presented in Appendix B, and it confirms the stability of the
results.11
The first column of Table 5 reports the coefficient associated with each
variable. The "t-statistic" in parentheses-indicates the statistical
significance of the coefficient; a t-statistic in excess of 2 means that the
coefficient is statistically significant. With the exception of wealth, all
11As discussed earlier, little is known about the link between applicant
characteristics and loan performance; thus, the results describe what lenders
actually consider in their decision to approve or deny a loan, but these are
not necessarily the factors that would provide the best predictions of
repayment or default.
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Ability to Support Loan
Housing Expense/Income .47
(3.2)





Consumer Credit History .33
(9.8)
Mortgage Credit History .35
(3.0)
Public Record History 1.20
(7.0)







Denied Private Mortgage Insurance 4.70
(9.6)
Rent/Value in Tract .68
(3..5)
Loan Characteristics





















Percent of. Correct Predictionsb
3062
89
aFor variables entered as 0 or I (see the notes to this table), the increase
in the probability of denial associated with the variable. For continuous
variables, the increase in the probability of denial associated with a change
in the variable equal to one standard deviation.
bThe number of applicants with a probability of denial greater than 50 percent
who were denied, plus the number of applicants with a probability of approval
greater than 50 percent who were approved, as a percent of the total sample.











Percent Denied Private Mortgage Insurance
Rent/Value in Tract
Two to Four-Family Homes
= 1 if greater than .30,
0 otherwise
value of question #46
value of question #36 less question #38
if no "slow pay" account (code I in question #43)
if one or two slow pay accounts (code 2)
if more than two slow pay accounts (code 3)
if insufficient credit history for determination (code 0)
delinquent credit history with 60 days past due (code 4)
serious delinquencies with 90 days pas~ due (code 5)
= 1 if no late payments (code 1 in question #42)
= 2 if no payment history (code 0)
= 3 if one or two late payments (code 2)
= 4 if more than two late payments (code 3)
= 1 if any public rehord of credit problems (codes i, 2, 3, 4 in question
0 otherwise
1989 Massachusetts unemployment rate for applicant’s industry
= i if self-employed
0 otherwise
value of loan amount divided by question #50
derived from question #53
rental income divided by estimate of value of rental property from
Census
= 0 if purchasing s single-family or a condo,
= 1 if purchasing e two to four-family home
= 1 if applicant was black or Hispanic,
= 0 otherwise
Means and Standard Deviations:















28the variables in the equation have a statistically significant impact on the
probability of denial.
The importance of the variables to the denial decision cannot be
interpreted solely from the t-statistics or from the coefficients themselves,
but rather depends on the values of the variables in the equation. Thus, the
second column presents a measure of the impac~ of each variable on the
probability of denial. For variables that have values of 0 or i, such as
self-employed, the figures in the second column represent the increase in the
probability of denial associated with having that particular characteristic.
That is, the probability of denial increases 35 percent for a person who is
self-employed.12 Since the average denial rate for the sample as a whole is
14.5 percent, the probability of denial for the average applicant who happens
to be self-employed would be roughly one-third greater than the average, or
19.6 percent. For continuous variables, such as the total obligation ratio,
12Logit regressions are particularly suited to modelling discrete
outcomes, such as approval or denial. However, the resulting equations are
nonlinear and, therefore, calculating the impact of changes in variables is
more complicated than in the more familiar ordinary least squares and other
linear regression forms. In deriving the impact values reported in Table 5,
the first step is to determine the probability of denial in the absence of a
particular characteristic, such as being self-employed. This requires
determining for each non-self-employed applicant the probability of denial
based on the coefficients of the equation reported in Table 5. These
estimated probabilities for each applicant are then averaged to get a single
figure for the group. The second step is to add to each non-self-employed
applicant’s probability of denial the impact of being self-employed (the
coefficient 0.52 multiplied by I). These new probabilities are averaged. The
figure reported in the second column is the percent difference between the
average probability of denial for the non-self-employed with the self-
employment effect and the probability for the non-self-employed without it.
For a continuous variable, such as the total obligation ratio, the
procedure is slightly different. In this case, the first step is to determine
the estimated probability of denial for each applicant in the sample, and then
average the probabilities. The second step is to add one standard deviation
to the total obligation ratio for each applicant, recalculate the estimated
probabilities of denial, and average the probabilities. As before, the value
reported in the second column is the percent difference between these two
average probabilities.
29the figures in the second column represent the increase in the probability of
denial associated with a one standard deviation change in that variable. That
is, if the total obligation ratio rises 11 percentage points (one standard
deviation), the probability of denial increases by 33 percent.
Ability of applicant to support loan. As expected, the results confirm
that high obligation ratios increase the probability of having a loan
application denied. Because the two obligation ratios tend to move together,
that is, an applicant with a high housing expense ratio generally also has a
high ratio of total debt payments to income, it is difficult to sort out
precisely the relative importance of the two ratios. Suffice it to say that
these measures are crucial to the lending decision. As discussed above, one
standard deviation increase in the total obligation ratio raises the
probability of denial by 33 percent.
Economists have long argued that perhaps one of the reasons that
minorities are denied mortgage loans more frequently than whites is that they
have less wealth. The net wealth coefficient is not statistically
significant, however, a result that supports lenders’ claims that they do not
place much weight on wealth.13 As reported in Appendix B, liquid assets also
do not appear to affect the probability of denial, although they are cited in
secondary market guidelines as a compensating factor and are frequently
mentioned by lenders as an important consideration. The answer may be that
liquid assets are frequently used for the down payment and therefore their
effect is captured by the loan-to-value ratio. Pre-screening may also exclude
people Without enough cash to settle.
13An equation was also estimated including income, liquid assets, and the
ratio of base to total income as alternative measures of the applicant’s
ability to carry a loan. None of these variables has a statistically
significant effect on the probability of being denied; the results can be
found in Appendix Table BI.
30Risk of default. Credit information was categoriZed by the severity of
the problem in the consumer, mortgage, and public records areas; the precise
definitions can be found in the notes to Table 5. The results show clearly
that an increase in credit problems raises the probability of having the loan
denied. A problem in the public records area, such as a bankruptcy, raises
the probability of denial 114 percent.14 Thus, if an applicant with average
characteristics of the sample had a bankruptcy, this person’s probability of
denial would roughly double from 14.5 percent to 31.0 percent.
Instability of income, whether stemming from a higher likelihood of
becoming unemployed or from being self-employed, increases the probability of
denial. Self-employment has by far the larger effect, however, raising the
probability of denial by 35 percent~15
Potential default loss. A high loan-to-value ratio raises the
probability of denial, but the effect is relatively small. This result occurs
because virtually all applicants with loan-to-value ratios over 80 percent
must secure private mortgage insurance. Thus, as shown in Table 5, the denial
of private mortgage insurance virtually precludes attaining a mortgage. It
should be noted, however, that very few applicants were turned down for
private mortgage insurance. The large impact, therefore, means that those who
were turned down were very unlikely to get a mortgage, not that denia7 of
14An alternative characterization of credit history, which treats the
credit information as individual dummies rather than as semi-continuous
variables, is presented in Appendix Table B2. The results are fully
consistent with those in Table 5.
~An equation was estimated that also included years on the job and the
presence of a co-signer. Secondary market guidelines request documentation
for applicants who have been on the job less than two years, and the presence
of a co-signer reduces the risk of default. The results, which can be seen in
Appendix Table B3, have the expected signs, but neither variable has a
statistically significant effect on the probability of denial.
31private mortgage insurance was the most important reason to be denied a
mortgage loan.
The appropriate way to treat private mortgage insurance was a difficult
decision, because these insurers consider the same information provided the
financial institutions. Thus, in one sense, they could be considered simply
another lender and the mortgage insurance variable omitted from the equation.
On the other hand, insurers could be viewed as outside the direct lending
market, and, to the extent that their denials fell disproportionately on
minorities, excluding a variable representing denial of mortgage insurance
from the equation would ascribe to lenders differential treatment occurring
elsewhere in the system. For this reason, the denial of mortgage insurance
was included in the equation.
Since the treatment of private mortgage insurance is controversial, it
should be noted that excluding private mortgage insurance from the equation
has little impact on the coefficients of the other variables; the exception,
not unexpectedly, is the loan-to-value ratio, which takes on somewhat greater
importance in the absence of private mortgage insurance (Appendix Table B4).
Similarly, estimating the equation excluding those applicants who were denied
private mortgage insurance has little impact on the basic results; again the
exception is the loan-to-value ratio.16
Finally, the theoretical construct to standardize for the riskiness of
the neighborhood in which the property was located entered the equation with
the expected sign and was statistically significant. That is, the greater the
rent-to-value ratio, which attempts to measure the variability of housing
~6In terms of the determinants of private mortgage insurance itself,
nearly all the variables included in the mortgage loan decision equation,
including race, appear to be relevant. The effect of race disappears,
however, with the addition of information about the racial composition of the
tract in which the applicant is purchasing the property (Appendix Table BS).
32value from tract to tract, the greater the likelihood the applicant will be
denied a mortgage loan.17 An equation was also estimated that included a
dummy variable for each of the more than 500 tracts in the sample - the
ultimate exercise in controlling for neighborhood characteristics. The
inclusion of these additional variables has a modest impact on most of the
other coefficients in the original equation; the exception is the coefficient
on race, which increases (Appendix Table B9).18
Loan characteristics. The loan characteristic that turned out to be
important is whether the applicant was applying for a mortgage for a two- to
four-family home.19 Financial institutions clearly are less willing to make
17EGuations were also estimated with several alternative indicators of
the risk of loss arising from the property’s location (Appendix Table B6);
these include vacancy rates, the appreciation in housing values, and a dummy
for tracts with more than 30 percent minority population. These variables do
not alter the basic equation appreciably. It appears that although blacks and
Hispanics tend te reside in minority areas, they are not being denied
mortgages because of_where they live. Minorities living in white areas are
also denied mortgages at higher rates.
The foreclosure rate by tract was also included in the basic equation as
a measure of neighborhood risk, but its coefficient was statistically
insignificant and it had no impact on the race coefficient (Appendix Table
B7). It should be noted that most of the neighborhoods with large minority
populations do not have high rates of foreclosure (Appendix Table B8).
18The race coefficient might increase for two reasons. First, the racial
composition of the tract affects the denial rates for both white and minority
applicants. For whites the denial rate increases from I0 percent in
predominantly white tracts to 16 percent in tracts with 30 percent or more
minority population; the comparable figures for minority applicants are 25
percent and 33 percent, respectively. Since white applicants are hurt
relatively more by buying property in minority tracts, excluding tract
information could artificially raise the denial rate for white applicants and
reduce the effect of being a minority on the probability of denial. Including
the tract information, therefore, raises the coefficient on race. The second
possible explanation is that tracts vary by many characteristics other than
race, and many predominantly white tracts may simply have poor quality housing
and other factors that affect the risk of the loan.
19The duration of the loan and whether the rate was fixed or variable
were also tried, but proved not to add any information. The results of this
exercise are shown in Appendix Table BIO. Also tried were whether the loan
was applied for under a special program and whether a gift or a grant
contributed to the down payment; the latter slightly reduced the probability
of denial, but had little impact on the rest of the basic equation.
33loans on two- to four-family housing that involves rental arrangements. The
positive coefficient says that if the property is a multi-unit dwelling, the
probability of denial rises 42 percent.
Personal characteristics. The only personal characteristic that appears
to enter into the loan denial decision is the race of the applicant.2° The
positive and statistically significant coefficient suggests that after
accounting for obligation ratios, wealth, credit histories, stability of the
applicants’ incomes, loan-to-value ratios, private mortgage insurance, and
neighborhood characteristics, the race of the applicant still plays a role in
the lender’s decision to approve or deny the loan. Thus, for an individual
with average white economic characteristics and minority race, the probability
of denial increases 56 percent.
Evaluation of the results. A logical question is "How good are these
results?" This question can be broken into four parts. The first pertains to
the robustness of the results with regard to race; the second pertains to the
broader issue of how much of the variability in approval and denial rates is
explained by the equation; the third relates to whether the results can be
explained by variations in underwriting standards among lenders; and the
fourth relates to the pervasiveness of the behavior captured in the equation.
With regard to the race variable, nearly every equation that was
estimated had virtually the same coefficient and degree of statistical
significance. As shown by the supplementary equations reported in Appendix B,
adding variables to the equation reported in Table 5 had little impact on the
coefficient of race or for that matter on most of the other coefficients in
2°The age, sex, marital .status, and number of dependents do not affect
the probability of having a loan application denied (Appendix Table B11).
34the equation.21 In short, the effect of race on the probability of denying a
loan application was consistently positive, large, and statistically
significant.2~
Robustness of the race coefficient in and of itself does not fully
answer the question of how much credibility should be given to these results.
If important variables that differed by race were missing from the analysis,
the race variable could be picking up their effect. Two responses address the
issue of omitted variables. First, the survey included every variable
mentioned as important in numerous conversations with lenders, underwriters,
and examiners and no reviewer suggested any other economic factor that should
be included in the equation.
Second, the variables included in the equation do a good job of
explaining the decision to approve or deny. Although no simple measure of
"goodness of fit" exists for equations that estimate the probability of an
action, the explanatory power of the equation can be assessed. The first
column of Table 6 reports actual denial rates for applicants in the survey by
total obligation ratio; that is, the denial rate for very good credits
~iVarious interaction terms were tested to examine whether a combination
of certain variables was essential to the mortgage lending decision.
Interaction between the loan-to-value ratio and the obligation ratios and
credit history variables, as well as the interplay between the obligation
ratios and the credit variables were all tested. Only the loan-to-value ratio
and consumer payments interaction term was statistically significant. The
importance of this variable, however, derived solely from its severe
collinearity with the consumer payments index; the consumer payments variable
becomes insignificant when this interactive term is included, and the
correlation between the two variables is 0.9. None of these interactive terms
affected the race coefficient or its statistical significance. Finally, some
non-linearity in the obligation ratios and the loan-to-value ratio was
examined, but it did not improve the fit of the equation or change any of the
results for the other variables.
~2As shown in the correlation matrix (Appendix Table B14),
multicollinearity between any two independent variables is not affecting the
results.
35Tabl e 6





Predicted from Equation Based on
Full Original Key
Model HMDA Dataa Variablesb
36 percent or lower 9.9 10.6
Between 36 percent and 40 percent 14.4 16.2




aEquation includes race, sex, and income of the applicant and the loan amount.
bKey variables add to the original HMDA data a dummy when the ratio of housing
expense to total income exceeds 30 percent, a measure of the applicant’s
consumer payment credit history, and the applicant’s loan-to-value ratio.(obligation ratios 36 percent or lower) is 9.9 percent and for poor credits
(obligation ratios in excess of 40 percent) is 38.8 percent. The second
column reports the denial rates predicted by the equation for each group. For
the good credits, the equation performs remarkably well, predicting 10.6
percent compared with the actual of 9.9 percent. The results for the denial
rates for poor credits are also quite good, 32.3 percent compared to the
actual of 38.8 percent.
In order to have a better sense of how good the equation results are, it
is useful to compare the predictions with those that emerge from an equation
using only information from the original HMDA data - namely, race, sex, and
income of the applicant and loan amount. As shown in the third column of
Table 6, these four variables produce a flat distribution of predicted denial
rates, explaining none of the difference between good and poor credits. In
other words, the additional variables included in the full model explain a lot
compared to the basic HMDA data. To provide just one more point of
comparison, the last column shows the predicted denial rates from an’equation
that adds only three additional variables to the original HMDA data - a dummy
for a ratio of housing expense to total income in excess of 30 percent,
consumer payment credit history, and loan-to-value ratio. This equation
begins to pick up some of the tilt in denial rates as applicants move from
poor to good credits, but a substantial gap remains between actual and
predicted rates.
Third, the question arises about the pervasiveness of the results. That
is, does the impact of race come from a single large institution operating in
a discriminatory manner or is the practice widespread? To test whether race
was consistently an important factor in the mortgage lending decision, the
sample was divided into large lenders and small lenders. Large lenders, whichaccounted for only 5 percent of the institutions, received exactly 50 percent
of minority applications; the other 50 percent of minority applications were
distributed among the remaining 95 percent of the institutions. Separate
equations were then estimated for the two sub-samples. The results indicate
that the model is stable across institutions of vastly different size, and
that race is an important explanatory factor in mortgage lending decisions
among both small and large lenders (Table 7). In short, the results represent
a widespread phenomenon, not just the behavior of a single institution.
Finally, even though the variables in Table 5 standardize for applicant
and property characteristics, the argument remains that minorities may be
treated the same as whi~es within any given institution, but may simply
frequent institutions with tougher lending standards. To test this
hypothesis, a "tough" lender variable was added to the basic equation. This
variable was constructed by estimating the equation for white applicants only
and including a separate dummy variable for each lender, and then designating
specific lenders as "tough" ba~ed on the coefficients of the lender dummies.
The inclusion of this variable, however, had virtually no effect on the
coefficients of the other variables and the variable itself was statistically
insignificant (Appendix Table B12). This result was not unexpected given that
most lenders conform to secondary market guidelines. Including separate dummy
variables for all institutions in the sample alters the coefficients slightly,
but does not change the basic results.
This assessment shows that the results presented in Table 5 merit
serious consideration. The coefficient of the race variable is stable and
always statistically significant; it is difficult to think of omitted
variables linked with race that could be biasing the race coefficient; and the
overall equation does a very good job of explaining the variation in denialTable 7
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aThe number of applicants with a ~probability of denial greater than 50 percent
who were denied, plus the number of applicants with a probability of approval
greater than 50 percent who were approved, as a percent of the total sample.
39rates. Moreover, the equation is describing widespread behavior, not simply
that of a single large institution or of particular types of institutions, and
variation in lending standards does not appear to explain the results.
An Alternative Approach
Estimating an equation that includes an explicit measure for race is not
the only way to test whether race is an important factor in the mortgage
lending decision. An equally good alternative is to estimate an equation for
white applicants and then plug in the obligation ratios, loan-to-value ratio,
credit history, and other values for each black/Hispanic applicant to
calculate that applicant’s probability of denial. The resulting discrepancy
between the actual minority denial rate and the estimated minority denial rate
based, on the white equation can be interpreted as the effect of race on the
mortgage lending decision.
The equations estimated separately for white and black/Hispanic
applicants are reported in Appendix Table B13 and the results of estimating
the probability of denial based on the white equation are shown in Table 8.
If blacks/Hispanics had their own characteristics, that is, high obligation
ratios, weaker credit histories, higher loan-to-value ratios, and less likely
to buy a single-family home, but were treated by lenders like whites, their
average denial rate would be 20.2 percent rather than the actual 28.1 percent
experienced by minority applicants. In 6ther words, economic, property and
neighborhood characteristics explain much of the higher minority denial rate,
but 7.9 percentage points remain unexplained.
If the 7.9 percentage point discrepancy is attributed to the effect of
race on the lending decision, this amount can be added to the white denial
rate to estimate the racial impact starting from the white base. That is, the
third line in Table 8 shows what the denial rate would have been for black and
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Actual Denial Rate for Blacks/Hispanics in Sample
Denial Rate for Blacks/Hispanics with Black/Hispanic
Characteristics but White Experience
Denial Rate for Blacks/Hispanics with White
Characteristics but Black/Hispanic Experience





Addendum: Ratios of Black/Hispanic to White Denial Rates
Actual (2,8. I~10~3)
Based on Black/Hispanic Characteristics (28,1/20.2)




41Hispanic applicants if they had white obligation ratios, loan-to-value ratios,
credit histories, and other characteristics but were treated by lenders like
minorities. Thus, even if minorities had all the economic and property
characteristics of whites, they would have experienced a denial rate of 18.2
percent, 7.9 percentage points more than the actual white denial rate of 10.3.
Some ambiguity arises when these various denial rates are used to
characterize the ratio of minority to white denial rates. If the ratio is
calculated using black/Hispanic characteristics, the ratio is 1.4 to I; if
white characteristics are used, the ratio is 1.8 to I. The 1.8 to I ratio is
the appropriate comparison with the 2.7 to I ratio of unadjusted denial rates,
since both use the white experience as the base.
The important point, however, is that the ratios bracket the 56 percent
increase in the probability of denial for minority applicants reported in
Table 5. This confirmation of the earlier results lends additional support to
their credibility.
VI. Conclusions
This study has examined one avenue through which differential treatment
could affect minorities’ access to credit and opportunities for homeownership.
It found that black and Hispanic mortgage applicants in the Boston area were
more likely to be turned down than white applicants with similar
characteristics.
It is important to clarify the limited focus of this analysis; it
abstracts from discrimination that may occur elsewhere in the economy. For
example, if minorities are subject to discrimination in education or labor
markets, they will have lower incomes and their applications may reflect
higher obligation ratios, greater loan-to-value, or poorer credit history.
42Similarly, if blacks and Hispanics are discouraged from moving into
predominantly white areas, they will limit their search to neighborhoods
sanctioned for minorities. These tend to be older central cities with high-
density housing, such as two- to four-family homes. Denial of a mortgage loan
application on the basis of either these economic or property characteristics
would not be considered discriminatory for the purposes of this study.
Even within the specific focus of conventional lenders, the reported
measure of the hurdles faced by minorities should be placed in perspective;
differential treatment can occur at many stages in the lending process. For
example, minorities may be discouraged from even applying for a mortgage loan
as a result of a pre-screening process. Similarly, if white applicants are
more likely than minority applicants to be "coached" when filling out the
application, they will have stronger applications than similarly situated
minorities. In this case, the ratios and other financial information in the
final application, which were the focus of this analysis, may themselves be
the product of differential treatment. This study does not explore the extent
to which coaching occurs, but rather focuses on the impact of race on lenders’
decisions regarding the final applications received from potential borrowers.
The results of this study indicate that race does play a role as lenders
consider whether to deny or approve a mortgage loan application. The impact
of race is substantially less than indicated by the original 1990 HMDA data,
which showed that black and Hispanic applicants for mortgages in the Boston
metroPolitan area in 1990 were turned down at a rate 2.7 times that for white
applicants. As it turns out, the higher denial rate for minorities in Boston
is accounted for, in large part, by their having higher loan-to-value ratios
and weaker credit histories than whites. They are also more likely to be
trying to purchase a two- to four-unit property rather than a single-family
43home. Nevertheless, after taking account of such factors, a substantial gap
remains.
A black or Hispanic applicant in the Boston area is roughly 60 percent
more likely to be denied a mortgage loan than a similarly situated white
applicant. This means that 17 percent of black or Hispanic applicants instead
of 11 percent would be denied loans, even if they had the same obligation
ratios, credit history, loan to value, and property characteristics as white
applicants. In short, the results indicate that a serious problem exists in
the market for mortgage loans, and lenders, community groups, and regulators
must work together to ensure that minorities are treated fairly.Appendix A
Attachment I
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
FOLLOW-UP TO 1990 HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE ACT (HMDA) REPORTS
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING LOAN/APPLICATION REGISTER (LAR)
Our records indicate that your institution listed (XX) applications from
blacks and Hispanics in your 1990 HMDA Report; all of their identification
numbers and basic HMDA information are reproduced in Attachment 4, the
Loan/Application Register. As a control group, we have randomly selected (XX)
white applicants; the information for the white applicants also appears in the
Register. Although this information is taken directly from your submissions,
it would be useful for you to che~k it for accuracy.
In addition, please review "Reasons for Denial" (column 19), and if you
have not already included the reasons, please enter that information at this
time. The reasons should conform to Attachment 2, Regulation B, Form C-]
"Sample Notice of Action Taken and Statement of Reasons" (Adverse Action
Notice). The reasons (up to three) should be entered on the Register, from
left to right in the space provided.
Thirty-eight questions, listed below, have been added to the Register.
All requested information should be provided from the loan documentation as of
the date of decision for the loan. Please enter the requested data for each
of the (XXX) applicants on the expanded Register. If any of the requested
information was not collected, put "X" in the column.
A. Data from Residential Loan Application (Fannie Mae Form 1003), see sample
on Attachment 3.
Note: Information for loan applications which were approved should come
from the standard loan application. Some of the requested
information for denials may have to be obtained from other
documentation in the loan folder.




22: Years of school
A - Applicant
C - Co-applicant





U - Unmarried (includes single, divorced and widowed)
S - Separated
24: Number of dependents
A - Applicant
C - Co-applicant
25: Years employed in this line of work (NE if not employed)
A - Applicant
C - Co-applicant
26: Years employed on this job (NE if not employed)
A Applicant
C - Co-applicant
4527: Self-employed (Y or N)
A - Applicant
C - Co-applicant
28: Position/title (NE if not employed)
A - Applicant
C - Co-applicant
29: Type of business (NE if not employed)
A - Applicant
C -_Co-applicant
30: Base employment monthly income (in dollars)
A - Applicant
C - Co-applicant
31: Total monthly income (in dollars)
A - Applicant
C - Co-Applicant
32: Proposed monthly housing expense (in dollars)
33: Purchase price (in thousands)
34: Other financing (in thousands)
For the next four columns, sum applicant and co-applicant
information if separate statements were completed.
35: Liquid assets (in thousands)
36: Total assets (in thousands)
37: Total nonhousing monthly payments (in dollars)
38: Total liabilities (in thousands)
B. Data Relating to Credit History
Column 39: List the number of commercial credit reports in the file
40: Did the applicants’ credit history meet your loan policy
guidelines for approval? (Y or N)
41: List the number of separate consumer credit lines on the credit
report
42: Credit history - Mortgage payments (see instructions, next page)
43: Credit history - Consumer payments (see instructions, next page)
44: Credit history - Public records (see instructions, next page)
C. Obligation Ratios (from lender worksheets)
Column 45: Debt-to-income ratio (housing expense/income)
46: Debt-to-income ratio (total obligations/income)
D. Loan Characteristics
Column 47: Fixed or adjustable rate (F or A)
48: Term of loan (months)
49: If the loan application was for a special (e.g. low income) loan
program, please provide the name of the program
50: Appraised value (in thousands)
51: Type of Property Purchased
Codes:
I - Condominium
2 - Single family
3 - 2-4 family
52: Was private mortgage insurance sought? (Y or N)
53: Was private mortgage insurance approved? (Y or N)
54: Did a gift or a grant account for any part of the down payment?
(Y or N; answer N if not known)
55: Did someone, other than the co-applicant, co-sign this
application? (Y or N)E. Unverifiable Information
Column 56: Type of information on the application which could not be
verified
0 - Not applicable (all verifiable)






Column 57: List total number of times application was reviewed by the
underwriter before the final loan decision was made.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING COLUMNS #42-44
Enter the number that best describes the credit history (from the commercial
credit report) of the applicant(s). Note that these columns should be completed
reqardless of the loan disposition or your answer to #40.





no mortgage payment history
no late mortgage payments
one or two late mortgage payments
more than two late mortgage payments
CREDIT HISTORY CODES - Consumer Payments (Column 43):
Note: Consider consumer payment history for previous two years only.
0 - Insufficient credit history or references for determination
I - no "slow pay" or delinquent accounts, but sufficient references for
determination
2 - one or two "slow pay" account(s) (each with one or two payments 30 days
past due)
3 - more than two "slow pay" accounts (each with one or two payments 30 days
past due); or one or two chronic "slow pay" account(s) (with three or
more payments 30 days past due in any 12-month pe~iod)
4 - delinquent credit history (containing account(s) with a history of
payments 60 days past due)
5 - serious delinquencies (containing account(s) with a history of payments
90 days past due)
CREDIT HISTORY CODES - Public Records (Column 44):
0 - no public record defaults
I - bankruptcy
2 - bankruptcy and charge-offs
3 - one or two charge-off(s), public record(s), or collection action(s),
totalling less than $300.
4 - charge-off(s), public record(s), or collection action(s) totalling more
than $300.
5 - information not considered
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Values of Variables Collected on Follow-Up Survey, Boston
Loan Application Register Approved and Denied Applicants







































Median number of units in property purchased
Median age of applicant
co-applicant
Median years of school of applicant
co-applicant
Percent of applicants married
co-applicants
Median number of dependents of applicant
Median number of years in line of work: applicant
co-applicant
Median number of years on current job: applicant
co-applicant




Median base monthly income of applicant ($)
co-applicant ($)
Median total monthly income of applicant ($)
co-applicant ($)
Median proposed monthly housing expense ($)
Median purchase price ($)
Percent with other financing
Median value liquid assets ($)
Median value total assets ($)
Median total nonhousing monthly payments ($)
Median value total liabilities(S)
Median number of commercial credit reports on file
Percent meeting credit history guideline for approval
Median number of credit tines on report
Percent with more than two late mortgage payments
Percent with delinquent consumer credit accounts
Percent with some public record defaults
Median obligation ratio (housing expense/income)
Median total obligation ratio (total obligations/income)
Percent of loans with fixed rates
Percent of’loans with 30-year terms
Percent of loans in specia{ loan programs





Percent seeking private mortgage insurance
Percent approved for private mortgage insurance
Percent with a gift or grant account used as part of the down payment
Percent with co-signer on application
Percent with unverifiable information
















































n.a. = not applicable
*Number of responses was too small to be meaningful
Note: Percentage base for each item does not include applicants for who~n information was missing.
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Alternative Specifications of the Probability
of Denial of the Mortgage Application
Alternative specifications of the probability that a mortgage
application will be denied are presented in this appendix. The additional
variables are based on the model of mortgage lending outlined in the text and
the suggestions of experienced researchers in this field. The primary
conclusion is that the equation whose results are shown in Table 5 of the text
is very robust. Adding more variables has little effect on the coefficients
of most of the "basic" variables listed in Table 5. Of particular importance
to the conclusions drawn from this analysis, race continues to have a
statistically significant effect on the probability of being denied a mortgage
after the additional variables have been taken into account.
Ability to Support Loan
Table BI compares the basic equation from Table 5 with an equation
incorporating additional measures of the applicant’s ability to support the
loan. As can be seen, the coefficients of most of the basic variables are
affected only modestly by the addition of income, liquid assets, and the ratio
of base income to total income. The coefficient for race remains almost the
same. In both this equation and those that follow, changes in sample size may
account for some of the changes in coefficients.
None of the additional variables has a statistically significant
influence on the probability of being denied a mortgage. As noted in the
text, people with lower incomes tend to buy lower-priced homes and, thus, the
obligation ratio is a better indicator of the financial constraints on the
borrower. It is more surprising that liquid assets do not reduce the
probability of denial, especially as liquid assets are cited in Fannie Mae’s
secondary market guidelines as a factor that can compensate for other
weaknesses in the application.
Risk of Default
Credit History. Two alternative characterizations of the mortgage
history and consumer credit history variables are presented in Table B2. In
the equation in Table 5, the progression of credit problems is pre-specified
as described in the table notes. In Table B2 a dummy variable represents each
credit history code and the regression is allowed to determine the weights
attached to each code. The base for both mortgage and consumer credit history
is no late payments; thus, the dummy variables measure the increase in the
probability of denial from this standard. As can be seen, the regression
produces a ranking very similiar to that specified in the credit variables in
Table 5; a log likelihood test indicates that one cannot reject the hypothesis
that the coefficients of the credit variables are the same as assumed in the
specification in Table 5. Perhaps the most interesting result from the finer
breakdown is confirmation that borrowers with insufficient consumer credit
history to make a determination of their payment record face a higher
49probability of being denied a mortgage than borrowers with some late payments.
The finer breakdown of credit history does not alter the coefficients of the
other variables, including race.
The third equation appearing in Table B2 adds a dummy variable for those
applicants with a prior mortgage payment history to the basic equation. The
reasoning was that borrowers who already owned a home might be more likely to
have their applications approved; however, the variable provides no additional
information beyond that contained in Table 5.
Seniority and Co-siqner. In Table B3 the applicant’s years on the job
and the presence of a co-signer are added to the basic equation. While
frequent job changes could be a sign of upward mobility, they may also
indicate a higher risk of unemployment. The applicant may be unable to hold a
position or may be limited to jobs where the last hired is the first fired.
Fannie Mae guidelines require additional documentation for applicants who have
been at their current job less than two years. The presence of a co-signer
reduces the risk of default, since the co-signer’s financial strength as well
as the applicant’s stands behind the loan.
Although the signs are as expected, the additional variables do not have
a statistically significant effect on the probability of a mortgage
application being deni.ed and the coefficients of most of the basic variables
do not change very much. Again, the race coefficient remains large and
statistically significant. Replacing years on the job with a dummy variable
indicating the applicant had more than two years on the job produced similiar
results.
Potential Default Loss
Private Mortqaqe Insurance. As discussed in the text, the appropriate
treatment of private mortgage insurance is unclear. If race enters into the
insurance decision, the inclusion of a variable representing the denial of
insurance will understate the difficulties that minorities face in securing
mortgages, since the effect of race on the ability to get insurance and,
therefore, to get a mortgage would be subsumed in the mortgage insurance
variable. Accordingly, Table B4 shows the effect of omitting this variable.
Also shown is an equation in which all mortgage applicants who were denied
mortgage insurance are omitted from the sample. In both cases, the
coefficients for the other variables, including race, are similiar to those in
Table 5. These results suggest that the probability of denial facing minority
applicants is not substantially understated by including the mortgage
insurance variable in the basic equation.
Table B5 presents two equations that relate the denial of private
mortgage insurance to the economic characteristics gathered for this study.
Controlling for the characteristics in the basic equation, minority applicants
are more likely to be denied private mortgage insurance than white applicants.
Adding a variable for the racial composition of the census tract in which the
property is located, however, causes the racial coefficient to become
statistically insignificant. These equations must be viewed with caution,
since the number of observations is much smaller than in the other equations
5Oand since the variables collected for this study were not gathered for this
purpose.
Location. Table B6 adds to the equation in Table 5 several indicators
of the risks of loss arising from the property’s location. In the basic
equation, the riskiness of the neighborhood is represented by the ratio of
rental income to the value of the rental housing stock in the relevant census
tract. While this measure is justified by theory and the results in Table 5
are as predicted, lenders may rely on other indicators of neighborhood risk,
such as vacancy rates or the appreciation in housing prices in the tract. A
dummy variable indicating that minorities comprise more than 30 percent of the
tract population is also included. Although the racial composition of the
neighborhood is not an appropriate criterion for lending decisions, it was
routinely considered in appraisals and lending policies until the 1970s.
As can be seen, adding these variables does not alter the basic equation
appreciably. In particular, the coefficient for race remains significant
after taking account of the racial composition of the neighborhood. Although
blacks and Hispanics in the Boston area tend to live in minority
neighborhoods, they are not being denied mortgages solely because of where
they live. Blacks and Hispanics seeking to buy homes in predominantly white
areas also face a higher risk of being denied mortgages than comparably
situated whites.
Foreclosures. Some researchers have suggested the foreclosure rate as a
measure of neighborhood risk. This has considerable intuitive appeal, since
the lender’s objective is to minimize the probabiTity and costs of
foreclosure. The direction of causality is ambiguous, however. A high
foreclosure rate could be the result of lenders’ reluctance to make loans in a
neighborhood as well as a cause of such reluctance. Homeowners who fall
behind in their mortgage payments will not be able to get out from under their
troubles by selling their properties if prospective buyers cannot get loans.
Foreclosures were very infrequent in the Boston area until 1990 and,
thus, lenders making decisions in 1990 did not have much foreclosure history
to guide them. Since foreclosure is a lengthy~process, however, lenders might
have had some knowledge of foreclosures that were in the works. If so, it did
not affect their decision-making. As can be seen from Table B7, the effect of
the tract foreclosure rate on the probability of being denied a mortgage was
insignificant.
Table B8 shows the pattern of foreclosures in the planning districts of
the City of Boston along with the racial composition of the districts. The
districts with the very highest foreclosure rates were predominantly white.
Foreclosure rates in predominantly minority areas ranged from high (Mattapan)
to quite low (South End).
Tract Dummy Variables. As a final test of whether the coefficient on
race might be representing lenders’ concerns about the location of the
property, a dummy variable was used to represent each of the more than 500
census tracts in which applicants were attempting to purchase homes. This is
a crude approach. It provides no indication of why lenders might deny
mortgages in a particular area, and if minorities tend to be concentrated in
particular neighborhoods it risks attributing rejections that are influenced
51by the applicant’s race to location. Nevertheless, as can be seen from Table
B9, the inclusion of dummy variables for each census tract actually increased
the coefficient for the race variable.
Loan Characteristics
Table BIO adds more loan characteristics to the basic equation. As
before, these do not change the coefficients for the basic variables. Whether
the rate was fixed or variable had no effect on the probability of denial.
The effect of longer loan terms also was not statistically significant. The
presence of a gift or grant reduced the probability that the loan would be
denied, and the effect approached statistical significance.
Gifts are intended to give the borrower sufficient funds for the down
payment. Since the loan-to-value ratio has already been included in the
equation, it is not obvious why a gift would increase the likelihood of
approval. Perhaps it implies access to the resources of a parent or some
other source of financial strength.
Applications that were not made under special programs were denied more
frequently, but the effect was not statistically significant. Many of these
special programs are offered by the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency.
These are intended to encourage lending to lower-income and minority borrowers
and to first-time home buyers. Another large group consisted of First-Time
Homebuyer programs offered by various banks.
Personal Characteristics
Additional personal characteristics do not alter the basic results
(Table B11). The age, sex, and number of dependents of the applicant have no
significant effect on the probability of denial. The variable representing
marital status approached statistical significance, with applicants who were
not married facing a higher probability of being denied a mortgage, other
things equal.
Lender Standards
The equations in Table B12 attempt to take account of differential
lender standards. It has been suggested that black and Hispanic applicants go
disproportionately to institutions that have higher than average credit
standards and, therefore, higher denial rates for both whites and minorities.
This is a controversial hypothesis, since it implies that minority mortgage
applicants act against their own best interest; alternatively, the
institutions with higher denial rates may be more aggressive in soliciting
minority applications.
A "tough." lender variable was constructed by estimating the basic
equation with a dummy variable for each lender over the sample of white
applicants only. The coefficients of these dummies were then used to create a
dummy variable indicating that the lender had "tough" standards and the
52equation was estimated over the entire sample of applicants. As can be seen
from Table B12, the "tough" lender variable is not stati.stically significant
and does not alter the results. The inclusion of separate dummy variables for
each lender when the equation is estimated over the entire sample does reduce
the coefficient of the race variable; but it remains large and statistically
significant.
Separate Equations for White and Minority Applicants
An implicit assumption underlying the equation in Table 5 is that
lenders treat white and minority applicants the same except for their race.
In other words, lenders accord the same weights to credit history, obligation
ratios, location risk, and all the other characteristics of white and minority
applicants. An alternative possibility is that lenders assess the
creditworthiness of minorities quite differently than they do that of whites,
so credit history or obligation ratios are viewed differently if the applicant
is black or Hispanic.
To test this possibility, the basic equation from Table 5 was run with
and without the race variable and separately for white applicants and for
black and Hispanic applicants. The four equations, are shown in Table B13.
Comparing the residuals of the white and minority equations with those of the
equation excluding the race variable produces a chi-squared of 37.2 compared
to a critical value Of 23.7. This result implies that l~nders do not treat
whites and minorities the same, but does not indicate whether the source of
the difference lies in the constant or in the coefficients of the other
independent variables. The race variable in the basic equation allows the
constant to differ for minority and white applicants. When the separate white
and minority equations are compared with the basic equation, the chi-squared
is 12.8 compared to a critical value of 22.7. Thus, the hypothesis that
lenders treat blacks and whites the same, except for race, cannot be rejected.
Correlation Matrix
Table B14 presents a matrix showing the correlations among the variables
used in the basic equation. As can be seen, multicollinearity between any two
independent variables is not driving the results, because no two variables are
strongly correlated.
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Alternative Specifications of Probability of Mortgage Denial






Ability to SuF~port Loan
Housing Expense/Income .47 .47
(3.1) (3.1)
Total Debt Payments/Income .04 .04
(6.6) (6.2)






Base Income/Total Income -.53
(-1.7)
Risk of Default
Consumer Credit History .33 .33
(9.8) (9.8)
Mortgage Credit History 35 .33
(3.0) (2.8)
Public Record History 1.20 1.20
(7.0) (7.0)





Loan/Appraised Value .58 .60
(3.2) (3.2)
Denied Private Mortgage Insurance 4.70 4.73
(9.6) (9.6)
Rent/Value in Tract .68 .67
(3.5) (3.5)
Loan Characteristics









"See notes to Appendix Tables following Appendix Table 814, for variable definitions and
sources.
bThe nun~er of applicants with a probability of denial greater than 50 percent who were
denied, plus the number of applicants with a probability of approval greater than 50
percent who were approved, as a percent of the total saraple.
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Alternative Specifications of Probability of Mortgage Denial











Abil~ty to Support Loan
Housing Expense/Income .47
(3.1)





Consumer Credit History .33
(9.8)
Mortgage Credit History .35
(3.0)
Public Record History 1.20
(7.0)
Consulter: Insufficient History
Consumer: One or Two Slow Accounts




Mortgage: One or Two Late
Mortgage: More than Two Late
Mortgage: Prior History







Denied Private Mortgage Insurance 4.70
(9.6)





















































































Alternative Specifications of Probability of Mortgage Denial































































































Alternative Specifications of Probability of Mortgage Denial





























































































































Ability to Support Loan
Housing Expense/Income .44 .43
(1.3) (1.3)
Total Debt Payments/Income .07 .07
(4.0) (3,8)
Net Wealth -.0004 -.0004
(-.7) (-.7)
Ri§k of Default
Consumer Credit History .20 .20
(2.7) (2.7)
Mortgage Credit History -,08 -.13
(-.2) (-.3)
Public Record History 1.02 1.02
(2.5) (2.5)





Loan/Appraised, Value 1.53 1.72
(1.9) (2.1)
Rent/Value in Tract -1.13 -1.78
(-.8) (-I.0)
Minority Population Share .55
(1.4)
Loan Characteristics
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Alternative Specifications of Probability of Mortgage Denial




















Denied Private Mortgage Insurance
Rent/Value in Tract
Housing Units Boarded Up
Housing Units Vacant
Housing Value Appreciation









































































Alternative Specifications of Probability of Mortgage Denial

































































































as a Percent as a Percent Black and
of Owner- of Total Hispanic in
Occupied Units Housing Units Population
East Boston .37 .40 18.9
South Boston .34 .37 1.9
Mattapan .33 .37 94.5
Char[estown .32 .35 2.1
Fenway/Kenmore .24 .32 17.6
South Dorchester .18 .23 46.7
North Dorchester .18 .16 36.8
Allston/Brighton .18 .18 15.5
Jamaica Plain .17 .18 43.2
Roxbury .16 .23 90.2
Back Bay/Beacon Hilt .14 .29 5.5
West Roxbury .14 .15 3.2
South End .13 .17 52.3
Central .12 .13 7.0
Hyde Park ,07 ,08 27.1
Roslindale .05 .05 18.1
City of Boston .27 .22
aForeclosures are for the years 1988 through 1990.
bAll sellers are persons; commercial entities are excluded.
Source: Foreclosures were supplied by Banker & Tradesman; housing units
are from 1990 Census of Population and Housinq.
34.3
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Alternative SpecificatiOns of Probability of Mortgage Denial






Ability to Support Loan
Housing Expense/Income .47 .63
(3.1) (3.3)
Total Debt Pa~n~ents/Income .04 .06
(6.6) (6.4)
Net Wealth .00008 .00005
(1.1)           (.6)
Risk of Default
Consumer Credit History .33 .47
(9.8) (8.3)
Mortgage Credit History .35 .57
(3.0) (2.1)
Public Record History 1.20 1.69
(7.0) (7.O)





Loan/Appraised Value .58 .81
(3.2) (2.5)
Denied Private Mortgage Insurance 4.70 5.68
(9.6) (8.9)













* Constant is included in the dummy variables for the census tracts. These are not shown
because they are so numerous.
"The large nL~d~er of variables in this equation required a more powerful con~uter and the
regression package available did not calculate percent correct predictions.Apgendix Table BIO























Not a Special Loan Program
Term of Loan









.00008                .00007

















































































































































Variable (t-Statistic) (t-Statistic) (t-Statistic)
Constant -6.61 -6.65
(-17.0) (16.9)
Ability to Support Loan
Housing Expense/Income .47 .47 .47
(3.1) (3.1) (2.8)
Total Debt Payments/Income .04 .04 .05
(6.6) (6.6) (6.4)
Net Wealth .00008 .00008 .00007
(1.1) (I.1) (.7)
Risk of Default
Consumer Credit History .33 .33 .39
(9.8) (9.8) (10.0)
Mortgage Credit History .35 .36 .40
(3.0) (3.1) (3.1)
Public Record History 1.20 1.20 1.51
(7,0) (T.O) (7.3)
Probability of Unemployment .09 .09 .08
(3.3) (3.3) (2.7)
Self-Employed .52 .52 .67
(2.8) (2.8) (3.2)
Potential Default Loss
Loan/Appraised Value .58 .59 .67
(3.2) (3.2) (3.2)
Denied Private Mortgage Insurance 4.70 4.70 4.85
(9.6) (9.6) (8.8)
Rent!Value in Tract ,68 .68 .56
(3.5) (3.5) (2.6)
Loan Characteristics













Constant is included in th~ dL~mm/ variables for the lenders. These are not shown because they are so numerous.Appendix Table B13













Ability to Support Loan
Housing Expense/Income .47 .51
(3.1) (3.4)
Total Debt Payments/Income .04 .05
(6.6) (6.6)
Net Wealth .00008 .00005
(1.1) (.7)
Risk of Default
Consumer Credit History .33 .35
(9.8) (10.6)
Mortgage Credit History .35 .39
(3.0) (3.3)
Public Record History 1.20 1.27
(7.0) (7.6)





Loan/Appraised Value .58 .63
(3.2) (3.1)
Denied Private Mortgage Insurance 4.70 4.71
(9.6) (9.7)
Rent/Value in Tract .68 .74
(3.5) (3.9)
Loan Characteristics








































































I         2        3           4            5              6
RACE      HEXP      DTOI         NET~4      CONSPAY         MORTPA¥
I Race I;00
2 Housing Expenses/Income .06
3 Total Debt Payments/Income .07
4 Net Wealth -.08
5 consumer Credit History .20
6 Mortgage Credit History .14
7 Public Record History .14
8 Probability of Unemployment -.05
9 Loan/Appraised Value .14





















7 8 9 10 11 12







.12 .05 -.01 1.00
,02 .02 .001 .02 1.00
11 Denied Private Mortgage Insurance ,10
12 Two- to Four-Family Heine .23
13 Self-Employed -.07
Number of Observations: 3062
.05 .08 -.03 .07
-.01 .01 -,01 .07




.07 .01 .15 -,0003 1.00
.04 .05 .07 .11 .09





1.00Variable Definitions and Sources
Question numbers refer to the questions listed in Appendix A.
Data from lenders’ ~MDA reports were supglied by the tenders as












Consumer: One or Two Slow Accounts




Mortgage: One or Two Late
Mortgage: More than Two Late
Mortgage: Prior History
Probability of Unen~loyment
= I if applicant was denied a mortgage
0 if application was accepted
Self-Employed
= I if greater than .30,






















value of question #46
value of question #36 less question #38
sum of applicant and co-applicant tota| month[y
income (question #31)
value of question #35
applicant and co-applicant base income
relative to total inco~ (derived from questions
#30 and #31)
if no "slow pay" account (code I in question #43)
if one or two slow pay accounts (code 2)
if more than two slow pay accounts (code 3)
if insufficient credit history for determination (code O)
delinquent credit history with 60 days past due (code 4)
serious delinquencies with 90 days past due (code 5)
if no late payment (code 1 in question #42)
if no payment history (code O)
if one or two late payments (code 2)
if more than two late payments (code 3)
if any public record of credit problems (codes 1,2,3,4 in
question #44)
otherwise
if code 0 in question #43; 0 otherwise
if code 2 in question #43; 0 otherwise
if code 3 in question #43; 0 otherwise
if code 4 in question #43; 0 otherwise
if code 5 in question #43; 0 otherwise
if code 0 in question #42; 0 otherwise
if code 2 in question #42; 0 otherwise
if code 3 in question #42; 0 otherwise
if code was not 0 in question #42; 0 otherwise
1989 Massachusetts une~ployment rate for applicant’s
industry (from question #29)
Unemployment rates from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
GeoQraphic Profile of Employment and Unemployment, 1989
= 1 if applicant was self-employed
0 otherwise (from question #27)
Years on Job
Presence of Co-signer
=    value for applicant for question #26
= I if affirmative response to question #55
0 otherwiseLoan/Appraised Value
Denied Private Mortgage Insurance
Rent/Value in Tract
HoUsing Units Boarded Up
Housing Units Vacant
Housing Value Appreciation
Minority Population Share (>30 Percent)
Foreclosure Rate
Census Tract Dummy Variabte
(for each tract)
Two- to Four-Family Homes
Fixed-Rate Loan
~ot a Special Loan Program
Term of Loan









value of loan amount from original HMDA report
divided by question #50
= I if negative response to question #53
0 otherwise
rental income divided by value of rental
housing stock in census tract in which property
was located. Derived from U.S. Bureau of the
Census, 1990 Census of Population and Housin9f Summary
Tape File 3 (1990 Census)
percent of housing units in census tract in
which property was located that were boarded up
Source: 1990 Census
percent of housing units in census tract in
which property was located that were vacant
Source: 1990 Census
percent change in the median value of owner-occupied
housing between 1980 and 1990 in the census tract in which
in which the property was located
Source: Derived from 1990 Census and 1980 Census of
Population .and Housing, Summary Tape File 3




tota| foreclosures divided by owner-occupied housing units
Source: Foreclosures from Banker & Tradesman; housing units
from 1990 census
= I if property was located in census tract; 0 otherwise
= I if purchasing a two- to four-family home
0 otherwise (question # 51)
= I if fixed rate
0 otherwise (question #47)
= I if not applying under a special loan program
0 otherwise (question #49)
= value from question #48
= I if affirmative response to question #54; 0 otherwise
= I if application made to lender; 0 otherwise
= I if applicant was black or Hispanic,
= 0 otherwise (tenders’ HMDA report)
= applicant age from question #21
= 1 if applicant was mate
0 otherwise (tenders’ HMDA report)
= number of applicant’s dependents
(question # 24)
= 0 if applicant was married
1 otherwise (question #23)
= 1 if lender had a high denial rate for white applicants,
as described in Appendix B
0 otherwise
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